### High — Arbitrary file overwrite via path traversal

The added expression `filepath.Join(s.exportDir, req.Name)` passes the untrusted `name` directly to `os.Create(path)`. A request such as `{"name":"../../authorized_keys", ...}` can escape `exportDir`; `os.Create` then creates or truncates any file writable by the service account. Existing symlinks can similarly redirect the write outside the export directory.

### High — Unrestricted URLs enable SSRF

The added call `http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, rawURL, nil)` accepts requester-controlled URLs without restricting scheme, host, resolved address, port, or redirects. An attacker can make the service issue GET requests to localhost, private network services, or cloud metadata endpoints using the service’s network privileges. Even though the request context is later cancelled, the outbound request may reach a fast internal endpoint before handler completion.

### Medium — Unbounded downloads can exhaust disk space

The added `io.Copy(out, resp.Body)` copies each response without a byte limit, and the number of URLs is also unrestricted. An attacker can reference a very large or endless response and consume the filesystem containing `exportDir`, potentially disrupting the service and other workloads sharing that filesystem.

### Medium — Full URLs may expose credentials in logs

The added statement `log.Printf("export %s: downloading %s", id, rawURL)` records the complete requester-supplied URL. Signed URLs, user-info credentials, and query-string API tokens will be copied into application logs, exposing them to log readers and downstream logging systems.